Buyer power in U.K. food retailing: a 'first-pass' test by Lloyd, Tim et al.
  
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Tim Lloyd, Steve McCorriston, Wyn Morgan, Anthony Rayner, 
and Habtu Weldegebriel 
Article Title: Buyer Power in U.K. Food Retailing: A 'First-Pass' Test
Year of publication: 2009 
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1542-0485.1253 
Publisher statement: None 
 
 
 
Journal of Agricultural & Food
Industrial Organization
Volume 7 2009 Article 5
Buyer Power in U.K. Food Retailing: A
‘First-Pass’ Test
Tim Lloyd∗ Steve McCorriston† Wyn Morgan‡
Anthony Rayner∗∗ Habtu Weldegebriel††
∗University of Nottingham, tim.lloyd@nottingham.ac.uk
†University of Exeter, s.mccorriston@exeter.ac.uk
‡University of Nottingham, wyn.morgan@nottingham.ac.uk
∗∗University of Nottingham, anthony.rayner@nottingham.ac.uk
††University of Warwick, h.t.weldegebriel@warwick.ac.uk
Copyright c©2009 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.
Buyer Power in U.K. Food Retailing: A
‘First-Pass’ Test∗
Tim Lloyd, Steve McCorriston, Wyn Morgan, Anthony Rayner, and Habtu
Weldegebriel
Abstract
The potential existence of buyer power in U.K. food retailing has attracted the scrutiny of the
U.K.’s anti-trust authorities, culminating in the second of two comprehensive regulatory inquiries
in recent years. Such inquiries are authoritative but correspondingly time-consuming and costly.
Moreover, detection of buyer power has been dogged by the paucity of reliable evidence of its
existence. In this paper, we present a simple theoretical model of oligopsony which delivers quasi-
reduced form retailer-producer pricing equations with which the null of perfect competition can
be tested using readily available market data. Using a cointegrated vector autoregression, we find
empirical results that show the null of perfect competition can be rejected in seven of the nine food
products investigated. Though not conclusive on the existence of buyer power, the proposed test
offers a means via which the behaviour of the retail-producer price spread is consistent with it.
At the very least, it can corroborate the concerns of the anti-trust authorities as to whether buyer
power is potentially one source of concern.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In common with many national retail food markets in Europe, the rising degree of 
market concentration in the UK food sector has been a cause of concern to both 
consumer groups and food producers in recent years. By 2006, the four leading 
food retailers in the UK had a combined share of the grocery market of around 75 
per cent, with the largest of these accounting for around one-third of all food sales 
(Office of Fair Trading, 2007). The issue has also aroused the attention of the 
UK's principal anti-trust authority, the Competition Commission, which has 
undertaken two statutory inquiries into food retailing in the last decade 
(Competition Commission, 2000, 2008).  A key motivation underlying their 
scrutiny of the supermarkets was: 
 
‘ . . . [the] public perception of  . . . an apparent disparity between 
farm-gate and retail prices . . . which is seen as evidence by some 
that grocery multiples were profiting from the crisis in the farming 
industry’. Competition Commission (2000), vol.1, p.3 
 
Statutory inquiries are expensive in terms of time and resources and are 
thus not undertaken without good grounds for doing so. This paper offers one 
possible approach based on a ‘first-filter’ test of price data that may be used as 
part of the preliminary analyses into the presence of buyer power in such markets. 
Contingent on assumptions relating to functional form and technology, we reject 
the null hypothesis of perfect competition in seven out of nine specific food 
groups investigated. While not conclusive that buyer power is the primary cause 
of widening margins between retail and farm price spreads, as a first-pass test, it 
suggests that buyer power is a potential candidate among others. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide some 
background material to the UK Competition Commission’s concerns about buyer 
power exercised by dominant food retailers and the motivation for our testing 
procedure as a ‘filter.’1 In Section 3, we outline the theoretical model that 
underpins our conceptualisation of a vertically-related market. The model is by no 
means intended as a detailed description of the UK food chain, but it does serve as 
a useful device for characterising how prices are transmitted in such a market, 
albeit in simplified form. It also forms the basis for determining the appropriate 
econometric approach and the interpretation of the key variables used to identify 
the existence of oligopsony power. Section 4 describes the data that are used in 
the testing procedure while Section 5 shows how the test for oligopsony power 
                                                 
1
 The issue of countervailing power in vertical markets, while of growing interest in the academic 
literature (see, for example, Connor et al. (1996), Chen (2003)) and to policy-makers, is not 
examined here. 
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can be implemented using tractable techniques of time series analysis. The results 
are outlined in Section 6 and we offer some concluding comments in Section 7. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND 
 
(a) Concerns of Buyer Power by UK Food Retailers 
 
A key issue highlighted in the 2000 report was the extent to which retailers can 
exert buyer power over their suppliers and the potential impact this has on 
consumer choice and competition in the food chain (Competition Commission 
2000). The belief that buyer power existed and was potentially being abused had 
been one of the primary reasons for instigating the report. However, collating 
evidence of buyer power during the investigation had not been easy, not least 
because of the large number of ways that it may be applied.2 The report concluded 
that while there was only limited potential for abuse of seller power with respect 
to consumers, there were grounds for significant concern regarding food retailers’ 
relationships with suppliers, highlighting 27 oligopsonistic practices that 
specifically gave cause for concern.3 Despite the subsequent imposition of a 
Supermarket Code of Practice in October 2001 effectively outlawing such 
practices, concerns over buyer power remain and were not allayed by the findings 
in interim reports on the Code of Conduct in 2004 and 2005. Such concerns 
formed the basis for the Office of Fair Trading's recent decision to refer the 
supermarkets to a further Competition Commission inquiry (Competition 
Commission, 2008).   
Concerns were most cogently illustrated by the nature of trading between 
retailers and suppliers of “fresh” food products in that  '[g]enerally, suppliers of 
fresh produce appear to be most dependent on their largest main party customers 
[big supermarkets] for their sales' (Competition Commission, 2000, 11.15, p232) 
and '. . . most suppliers of fresh fruit and vegetables meat and poultry . . . appear 
to concentrate on trade with a limited number of suppliers (often four or less)' 
(Competition Commission, 2000, 11.8 p.231). Indicative figures from the food 
industry underline this reliance with some 75%4 of total UK output of apples and 
80%5 of total UK fresh potato output being sold to the supermarkets. Around 65% 
of liquid milk sales are accounted for by the main food retailers (KPMG, 2002). 
                                                 
2
 Buyer power can affect almost all aspects of the retailer-supplier contractual arrangement 
including the timing, form and level of the negotiated payment as well as shifting risks between 
the parties (see GfK (2007) for examples from the UK food industry).  
3
 These practices primarily related to the retailers’ interactions with suppliers rather than food 
manufacturers.  See Table 2.14, pp.140-143 of the Competition Commission's 2000 report for 
details.  
4
 English Apples and Pears Limited, personal communication 
5Yakovleva and Flynn (2004) 
2 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 7 [2009], Article 5
http://www.bepress.com/jafio/vol7/iss1/art5
   
 
 
With respect to meat products, the data are more indirect in that they relate to 
consumption of meat via the retail sector as a whole rather than the supermarkets 
alone, though given their share of consumer markets, the figures are informative 
of the likely dominance in the procurement market. With this caveat in mind, the 
data show that 85% of beef is consumed via the retail sector, with the 
corresponding figures for pork and lamb being 81% and 90% respectively.6 
Undertaking regulatory inquiries is time consuming and expensive and 
establishing detailed empirical evidence of the existence of buyer power is 
problematic especially as it can occur in many different forms (Dobson, 2005). 
The Competition Commission, however, felt it gathered enough evidence to show 
that buyer power existed. Given the range of different practices that can 
characterise retailer-supplier relationships and that may be the mechanism via 
which buyer power is exerted, to what extent though can these findings be 
foreshadowed using less expensive means based on available market data? In this 
paper we offer an approach that provides a simple, inexpensive first-filter test for 
exploring the UK food retail sector that relies on price data and acts as a precursor 
to potentially more detailed analysis. This test fits as mid-way between two 
different means of addressing the issue of buyer power. On the one hand, 
indicative measures often rely on anecdotal accounts, small-scale surveys of the 
parties involved or at a more representative level, summary measures of 
concentration. Relating simple measures of concentration to the existence of 
selling power has long been recognised as of limited value and the same is true for 
buying power (Clarke et al, 2002). For example, the high level of concentration 
evident in the UK food retailing sector, coupled with the high profits they report, 
is not necessarily indicative of the exploitation of buyer power. On the other hand, 
there is a spectrum of econometric approaches that may be employed to detect 
buyer power that encompass a wide range of challenges including accessing data, 
the level of dis-aggregation and so on.  
Where estimation is based upon price data alone, such as in orthodox price 
transmission studies (e.g. London Economics, 2004), the veracity of anti-trust 
inference is undermined by the reduced-form nature of the price regressions 
employed (Hoehn et al. 1999, p.113). Although structural econometric models 
address this issue of 'measurement without theory' directly, they are often 
confounded by data limitations and methodological shortcomings relating to 
market definition and the validity of the behavioural assumptions employed 
(Baker and Bresnahan, 1992). In these circumstances, a simple test derived from 
economic theory detecting the potential existence of buyer power offers some 
appeal (see, for example, Raper, Love and Shumway, 2007), and it is in this 
regard that this paper seeks to make a contribution. Specifically, we provide one 
                                                 
6
 Meat and Livestock Commission, personal communication. 
3Lloyd et al.: Buyer Power in U.K. Food Retailing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
   
 
 
such possible test by devising a simple restricted quasi-reduced form model of 
price formation at retailer and supplier levels in which rejection of the null 
hypothesis of perfect competition can be readily tested using widely available 
market-level data. While the approach does not aim to derive an explicit measure 
of buyer power, it does provide grounds for further testing for its potential 
existence. In doing so, it emphasises the test's 'path-finder' role and is suggestive 
of the desirability of further scrutiny such as that undertaken by regulatory 
authorities. 
There are two aspects to this ‘first-pass’ test. First, what is the nature of 
the specific concern(s) being addressed by the anti-trust authority? If there is 
concern over buyer power, then whatever the nature of the specific contractual 
arrangements between retailers and suppliers, the spread between retail and farm-
level prices should be increasing, as is implied by the quote in the Introduction. 
Second, with this as background, given some limiting but widely-used 
assumptions relating to functional form and the technology characterising the 
vertical food chain for a given commodity, a basis for testing can be established. 
The null hypothesis is that, in the presence of exogenous shocks, if the retail food 
sector is perfectly competitive, all changes in the retail-producer price spread are 
accounted for by marketing costs. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that 
the behaviour of the retail-producer price spread is consistent with a number of 
possible causes including the presence of buyer power.  
Of course, there are other factors that could cause the retail-food price 
spread to behave as it does but the simple test proposed here suggests that the 
anti-trust authorities have ‘good’ reason to pursue an investigation. In terms of the 
limiting assumptions, the role of technology (fixed versus variable proportions) 
may be an issue and can affect the price spread in the face of exogenous shocks, 
though fixed proportions is likely to be a ‘reasonable’ assumption for many 
product groups.7 Moreover, it is well-known in the industrial organisation 
literature that functional form may be an issue in identifying the exercise of buyer 
power. For example, with constant elasticity demand and supply functions, even 
with the existence of buyer power, the gap between the retail-farm price spread 
remain constant.8 However, our approach here is to start from the premise that 
widening margins have been already been identified as existing and thus our 
approach is to determine whether buyer power can be considered as one possible 
explanation of this and thus rejecting the null hypothesis would suggest more in-
                                                 
7
 McCorriston et al. (1998) also show that the behaviour of the retail-farm price spread is only 
marginally affected by the fixed versus variable proportions assumption and that buyer/seller 
power is likely to dominate the issue of technology. See also Sexton and Lavoie (2001) for a 
general critique of the variable proportions assumption in characterising links in the vertical chain. 
8
 See McCorriston et al. (1998) for the oligopoly case and Weldegebriel (2004) for the oligopsony 
case.  
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depth consideration by regulatory authorities is warranted. In identifying buyer 
power as a possible cause, we are not stating that it is the only possible cause 
merely that its potential presence would warrant further, more detailed 
investigation. 
In sum, the model here should be interpreted as a ‘first-pass’ test and used 
to complement investigations initiated by regulatory authorities. It confirms the 
possibility that the exercise of buyer power is a candidate in characterising the 
behaviour of the retail-producer price spread. It is relatively inexpensive in terms 
of time and data requirements and familiar to applied economists who focus on 
the behaviour of prices in related markets. It does not, however, prove the 
existence of buyer power nor, if buyer power does exist, detail the extent of buyer 
power. Nevertheless, as a first pass test, it is both potentially informative and 
useful. 
 
(b) Related Literature 
 
In terms of the academic literature, the test proposed here lies between two related 
fields in the industrial organisation literature. At one end is the estimation of 
structural models in the context of the new empirical industrial organisation 
literature. Bresnahan (1989) provides an overview. The key feature of this 
methodology is the use of exogenous shocks (such as exogenous shifts in the 
demand or supply functions) in order to identify the presence of buyer/seller 
power more generally. From this, one can retrieve a measure of the aggregate 
conjectures representing the degree of buyer/seller power in a specific market. In 
the approach followed here, we also employ exogenous shocks as a means to 
detect the potential for buyer power. Extensions of this methodology to the case 
of buyer power between the downstream food sector and producers have been 
explored in the agricultural economics literature. Just and Chern (1980) were 
amongst the first to develop this methodology for identifying buyer power with 
reference to the US tomato industry.  
At the other end is the theoretical and empirical literature on the incidence 
of policy changes (such as tax changes) or other shocks since the incidence of 
taxes may differ in the presence of buyer/seller power. There is a substantive 
theoretical literature on the issue of incidence on the presence of buyer/seller 
power (see, for example, Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) as an early example). 
McCorriston et al. (1998) extend this analysis in the context of the traditional 
retail-farm spread model while Weldegebriel (2004) further extends this 
theoretical framework to explore the role of oligopsony and the spread between 
retail and farm level prices. From the empirical side, Feuerstein (2002) and 
Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001), represent recent examples using the role of 
exogenous shifters to detect the relationship between seller power and incidence. 
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The approach followed here relates to these theoretical and empirical strategies in 
that we exploit the presence of exogenous shocks in order to identify the presence 
of buyer power based on a theoretical model of the incidence of shocks on both 
upstream and downstream prices. As we explain below, the detection of buyer 
power simply depends on how these shocks affect both sets of prices. While the 
simplicity of the approach does not allow us to retrieve an empirical estimate of 
the degree of buyer power, the trade-off does circumvent some of the obstacles 
inherent in the estimation of structural econometric modelling and the difficulties 
associated with the interpretation of estimated conjectures.  
More specifically, in the framework we present, the difference (or spread) 
between prices at different marketing levels can be attributed solely to marketing 
costs under competitive conditions. In other words, shocks impact on prices at 
each marketing level equally. If buyer power exists then the spread between retail 
and producer supply prices behaves differently since price setting by the sector 
with buyer power will be reflected in the mark down that the firms can earn, and 
so affects the spread. Hence, as we show in section 2, where buyer power exists, 
with albeit limiting but widely-used assumptions, market shocks have a 
differential impact at each stage in the marketing chain and thus determine the 
behaviour of the spread between prices at different vertical levels in addition to 
marketing costs. In effect, shocks to the underlying supply and demand functions 
are mediated through buyer power parameters and thus give rise to predictable 
effects on the spread. In the absence of buyer power, the effect of shocks is 
common at all vertical market levels so that the spread is simply determined by 
marketing costs.    
In what follows, we develop a model of price transmission in a two-level 
(i.e. retail and farm-gate) vertical market that explicitly allows for shocks in both 
the demand and supply functions for a food product. The theoretical framework 
delivers an equation for the determination of the price spread in which the impact 
of these shocks appears with definite sign in the presence of oligopsony power. 
This provides the theoretical basis for a simple empirical test of the presence or 
otherwise of perfect competition. We apply our approach to data from nine basic 
food groups (such as apples, eggs and beef) in the UK food industry. Results 
strongly point to the presence of a single relationship between the retail and 
producer prices for the majority of products, with the empirical test rejecting the 
null of perfect competition in seven out of nine of products at conventional levels 
of statistical significance. Furthermore, coefficients on the exogenous shifters are 
signed according to the predictions in the theoretical model in thirteen out of 
eighteen cases. Overall, the results suggest that the spread between producer and 
retailer prices is not consistent with perfectly competitive behaviour and thus 
might be caused by, at least as a candidate amongst other factors, the existence of 
oligopsony power in UK food retailing, a finding that is consistent with the 
6 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 7 [2009], Article 5
http://www.bepress.com/jafio/vol7/iss1/art5
   
 
 
conclusions of the Competition Commission (2000) investigation. Whilst by no 
means a substitute for legalistic scrutiny of accounts and contracts in anti-trust 
cases, our statistical test offers a complementary indicator of anti-competitive 
behaviour that may be easily applied in other similar analyses.      
 
3.  THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
In this section, we outline a simple framework that delivers a formal test of 
perfect competition that we use to motivate the empirical analysis. The model can 
be readily adapted to account for oligopoly power and the co-existence of 
oligopoly and oligopsony power.9 The model is static and ignores repeated 
interaction between downstream firms and suppliers over time, a simplification 
that allows for ease of interpretation of the shifters as a ‘first-pass’ test.. The 
demand function for the processed product is given by: 
 
 
),( DRhQ =
 (1) 
 
where R  is the retail price of the good under consideration and D is a general 
demand shifter. The supply function of the agricultural raw material is given by 
(in inverse form): 
 
 
),( SAkP =
 (2) 
 
where A  is the quantity of the agricultural raw material supplied to retailers by 
farmers and then resold by retailers to consumers as Q and S is the exogenous 
shifter in the farm supply equation. 
In accordance with the findings of the Competition Commission (op. cit.), 
the source of power in the food chain is given to be at the retail level in the form 
of buyer power. For a representative retail firm, the profit function is given by: 
 
 
)()()( iiiii QCAAPQQR −−=π  (3) 
 
where iC  is other costs and, assuming a fixed proportions technology,  aAQ ii /=  
where a  is the input-output coefficient. This assumption corresponds closely to 
                                                 
9
 We limit the discussion here to the oligopsony case as this was the issue of immediate concern to 
the UK Competition Commission. Including oligopoly will not change the nature of the tests 
outlined below; if the concerns related to oligopoly, the methodology still applies. If both 
oligopoly and oligopsony exist then the methodology is still applicable though it cannot 
distinguish between the two. However, since the methodology aims at a first pass test, this is not 
an immediate concern here. 
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the construction of the data in the vertical market chain used in the empirical 
analysis that follows.10 Constant returns to scale in distribution are assumed. The 
theoretical set-up assumes a static game and has no dynamic links on the basis 
that contracts between retailers and suppliers are assumed to be negotiated every 
year and the commodities for which we are concerned are essentially perishable 
except at very short time intervals. The first-order condition for profit 
maximisation is given by: 
 
 
i
i
i
i
i
i A
A
A
P
aAaPQ
C
Q
Q
Q
RQR
∂
∂
∂
∂
++
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
 (4) 
 
In order to get an explicit solution, consider linear functional forms for equations 
(1) and (2) and assume 1=a (which is consistent with the construction of the data 
series):  
 
 
cDbRhQ +−=
 (1’) 
 
 
gAkP +=
 (2’) 
 
with supply being given by: 
 
 
SQA +=
 
 
where S is the exogenous supply shifter. From this we can rewrite (4) as: 
 
 
gQPMR µ++=
 (4’) 
 
where µ is the aggregate input conjectural elasticity, such that with n firms in the 
retail sector, µ = (Σi [∂A/∂Ai][Ai/A])/n. This parameter can be interpreted as an 
index of buyer power with 0=µ  representing competitive behaviour and 1=µ  
representing monopsony behaviour. While µ is the measure of buyer power, as 
noted above, we do not aim to derive an explicit value for this parameter, but test 
only for its existence. M  is a composite variable that represents all other costs 
that affect the retail-farm price margin. 
 To allow for changes in costs, we assume a linear marketing cost function 
of the form: 
 
                                                 
10
 This technology is likely to be most appropriate for many of the products we include in the 
empirical analysis. 
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zEyM +=
 (5) 
where y is a constant and zE  represents the costs of inputs from the marketing 
sector (for example, wages). Using (1’), (2’), (4’) and (5), we can derive an 
explicit solution for the endogenous variables: 
 
 )1(1
)(
µ++
−−+−−
=
bg
bgSbzEcDbkbyhQ
 (6) 
 
        )1(1
)])1())(1)][(1(1[
µ
µ
++
+−+++−+++
=
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cDEbzgSkybbghR
 (7) 
 
 )1(1
)]))(1(1([][
µ
µ
++
+++−−−+−
=
bg
SkbgbgbzEcDbyhgP
 (8) 
 
To derive the spread between retail and producer prices, use (7) and (8) to give:  
 
    )1(1
)())(1(
µ
µµµ
++
+−++++
=−
bg
gSkbgcDgzEybghgPR
 (9) 
 
Note that if oligopsony power does not matter in determining the retail-producer 
price spread (i.e. 0=µ ), then equation (9) reduces to: 
 
                                              
MzEyPR =+=−
 (10) 
 
i.e. the source of the retail-producer price spread in a perfectly competitive 
industry is due to changes in marketing costs only. In this case, the exogenous 
shifters relating to the retail and agricultural supply functions play no role in 
determining the spread. This is not to say that they do not affect each price 
individually, but rather that because they affect retail and producer prices equally 
in a perfectly competitive industry they play no role in determining the relative 
gap between the prices at each stage of the food chain. Correspondingly, if 
oligopsony power in the food sector is important, each shifter affects the two 
prices differentially and thus the margin between the prices changes. In particular, 
in the presence of buyer power the demand shifter will be unambiguously positive 
and the supply shifter unambiguously negative. As such the demand shifter causes 
the margin to widen whereas the supply shifter will cause it to narrow. Intuitively, 
a rightward shift in the demand function will raise both the retail and farm-gate 
prices; but from (7) and (8), the changes to each of these prices vary in the 
presence of µ  such that the spread widens as indicated by equation (9). Similarly, 
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an exogenous shift in the supply function has a different relative effect on retail 
and farm level prices in the presence of buyer power with the ‘net’ effect on the 
spread being negative as indicated in equation (9).11  
 Equations (7)-(9) form the basis of our econometric modelling. Consider, 
first of all, equation (9) that relates to the retail-producer spread. Note that if 
buyer power does characterise the UK food sector, then the supply and demand 
shifters should enter our econometric model of the margin between retail and 
producer prices. Writing the margin equation in unrestricted form (i.e. in terms of 
prices) gives an empirical testable equation:   
 
 
SDMPR 43210 βββββ ++++=  (11) 
 
 The expected signs for the betas relate to the reduced form expressions for 
the determination of the retail-farm spread as reported in equations (9) and (10). 
Specifically, 01 >β , and 02 >β  irrespective of the degree of retail competition. 
The test for the rejection of perfect competition is whether the coefficients on the 
remaining variables in the retail-producer spread equation are statistically 
significant. Specifically, rejection of the (perfectly competitive) null hypothesis: 
 
 
0: 430 == ββH   
 
implies that perfectly competitive pricing is not congruent with the data.12 
Furthermore, equation (9) unambiguously signs the effect of the shifters. Whereas 
shocks to the demand shifter (which shift the demand curve to the right) widen the 
margin, supply-side shocks (which shift the supply curve to the left) narrow it, 
hence if oligopsony power is exercised (or is at least one of the potential 
candidate factors for the widening spread), the shifters are significant in the 
spread equation with signs such that 03 >β  and 04 <β  in (11).13 In the empirical 
section, we test this proposition using data for nine product groups. 
 
                                                 
11
 As with all studies in empirical industrial organisation, the issue of functional form matters. 
Given the focus here on the role of the exogenous shifters on the retail-farm spread, if we had 
constant elasticity inverse supply and demand functions, the spread would be constant. In this 
case, buyer/seller power may determine the magnitude of the size of the (static) spread but would 
not be consistent with exogenous shifters contributing to a widening spread.  
12
 In principle, we only require one of these shocks to be significant to point to rejection of perfect 
competition, though the evidence will be ‘stronger’ if both shocks are. In the results presented 
below, in most cases, both shocks matter in determining the rejection of competition. 
13
 With constant elasticity functional forms, the mark-up/mark-down will not change in the 
presence of buyer power. However, if we cannot reject the null hypothesis, then buyer power will 
not characterise the behaviour of the retail-producer price spread whatever the functional form. 
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4.  DATA FROM THE FOOD INDUSTRY14 
 
We apply our test method to assess whether we can reject perfect competition in 
UK food retailing using widely available market level data on prices of nine 
products, namely: apples (A); beef (B); bread (Br); chicken (C); Eggs (E) lamb 
(L); milk (M); pork (K) and potatoes (Pt) at retail (R) and producer (P) levels. The 
prices are deflated by the ‘all products’ Retail Price Index (1987=100) and 
expressed in terms of a standard unit that is comparable at both levels of the food 
chain (such as: pence/dozen for eggs; pence/kg of carcass weight equivalent for 
the meat products and pence/pint for liquid milk). The sample for each product 
begins in January 1990 and runs until October 2001 (giving 130 monthly 
observations) the date at which the Competition Commission’s Code of Conduct 
came into force.15 The price series are plotted in Figure 1 and details of the 
construction of the data are summarized in Appendix 1. 
We use fresh products as these are subject to the smallest degree of 
processing by the post-farm gate chain and thus potentially provide a clearer 
correspondence between theory and data. As highlighted in section 2, it is also in 
the fresh food sector where asymmetry in bargaining is most likely to be revealed, 
since this is where small suppliers and large buyers co-exist most visibly. Clearly, 
however, this correspondence between theory and reality is not perfect in a 
number of respects. For example, prices represent the weighted average across a 
category, rather than a single product (eggs includes branded and non-branded 
sales, albeit of a standard size); the product sold at retail may not be identical to 
that sold at the farm-gate (it is the ‘all milk’ price that is recorded for producers 
but semi-skimmed milk at retail).  
While meat products, which arguably undergo some of the most extensive 
processing in the sample of products in this study, have been adjusted by the Meat 
and Livestock Commission who convert them to a carcass weight equivalent, this 
is not so for bread which uses the price of a standard loaf at retail but the price of 
bread wheat to proxy for the producer price. Furthermore, retail prices are 
weighted across outlets and so include sales from independent retailers as well as 
supermarket chains, although the latter do dominate retail sales in the UK. Whilst 
these and other measurement issues potentially weaken the quality of the data for 
the purpose at hand, we merely point out here that they represent the best 
estimates that are currently available at the national level. We return to the 
                                                 
14
 Details of data series used and sources are given in Appendix 1. All statistical analysis is 
undertaken in PCGIVE 12.,0 Doornik and Hendry (2007) except the stationarity testing for which 
Eviews 6.0, Quantitative Micro Software (2007). Data and detailed results are available upon 
request.  
15
 Milk price data begins in January 1995. 
11Lloyd et al.: Buyer Power in U.K. Food Retailing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
   
 
 
important issue of data quality in light of the empirical results obtained in the 
following section.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, there are some product-specific idiosyncrasies in the 
price series, such as the seasonal price fluctuations for lamb (and to a lesser 
extent, milk) and the disparity between retail and producer price volatility in 
chicken. Interestingly, one feature that is common to all products is the steady 
decline in prices at the producer level. While some retail prices also decline, many 
do not. Interestingly, even in cases where retail price decline is evident, it does not 
appear to be as rapid as the decline observed at the producer level. This tendency 
for retail and producer prices to diverge over time gives rise to a widening in the 
price spread, a feature that is common to all products analysed here, with the 
exception of milk.16 While growth in the price spread is not in itself indicative of 
buyer power (since marketing costs may account for the observed behaviour), it is 
however noteworthy if only because growing spreads appear to be the norm over 
the sample period. Nevertheless, concerns about the impact of potential buyer 
power as investigated by the Competition Commission related to the existence of 
widening spreads between retail and farm prices in a number of commodity 
sectors. 
 The key issue that we address formally in the following section is whether 
the movement in the price spreads of these products can be attributed solely to 
marketing costs or whether it is also correlated with supply and demand shocks, 
as predicted by the theoretical model in the presence of buyer power. As noted in 
section 1, measures of product-specific marketing costs are not available in the 
UK and thus given the importance of labour costs in food retailing we use an 
index (base year 2000) of real average earnings in the UK service sector (M) to 
proxy for these costs. While an undeniably crude measure, this proxy does appear 
to explain much of the behaviour in the price spreads, as we report in the 
following section. Since buyer power is mediated through market shocks in the 
theoretical model, we attempt to capture such shocks using the following proxies 
in the empirical model. Specifically, to incorporate the impact of farm-level 
production costs the supply shifter (S) represents a real price index (base year 
1997) of all goods and services purchased on UK farms. Demand-side shocks are 
proxied by one of two measures depending on the market at hand. For meats and 
animal based products we use an index of media activity relating to the health and 
safety of food (D1). Specifically, this index represents the natural log of the 
cumulative count of articles relating to the health and safety of food published in 
four national broadsheet newspapers. This index is dominated by articles relating 
                                                 
16
 Plots of the spread over time (not shown in the interests of brevity) more clearly demonstrate 
this tendency. 
12 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 7 [2009], Article 5
http://www.bepress.com/jafio/vol7/iss1/art5
   
 
 
to BSE and can act as a shifter for all the meat products studied here.17 On the 
basis that such articles rarely relate to non-meat products, we have therefore used 
the food retail price index (D2) for these products on the basis that this represents 
a general demand shifter affecting the food retailing sector as a whole.18 The 
individual fresh products reported here represent such a small weight in the food 
retail price index that the movement in the latter can be a reasonable proxy for a 
general demand shifter for these non-meat products.19 Details about the 
construction of the proxy variables are given in Appendix 1 and the time series 
are plotted in Figure 2 for each measure. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 It should be noted that as the number of stories increases, this is a positive increase in the value 
of the shifter. This will cause the demand for non-beef meats to increase as consumers substitute 
away from beef and thus the prices of these meats will increase, ceteris paribus. However, with a 
positive increase in the shifter the price for beef should fall as this represents a leftward shift in the 
demand curve for beef and hence a price fall, ceteris paribus.  
18
 Ideally, the measure of income would be preferred as a demand shifter but this is not available at 
the same monthly frequency that we need to tie in with the price data. 
19One should also recall that we are not totally reliant on this shifter in determining buyer power 
since the significance of the supply shifter also matters. 
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Figure 1: Real Product Prices at Retail and Producer Levels20 
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Source: The data sources for these series are listed in the Appendix (Table 1). 
                                                 
20
 The quantity units for the vertical axes vary from commodity to commodity (e.g. per kg or per 
lb) but are all expressed in pence per unit. 
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Figure 1: (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: (Continued) 
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Figure 1: (Continued) 
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5.  EMPIRICAL METHOD 
 
To allow for the possibility that retail and producer prices of each product group 
are non-stationary and cointegrated, we couch the empirical analysis in a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) framework. For each of the nine product groups it is 
assumed that the data may be approximated by a VAR(p) model,   
 
 
ttptpttt εΨΦΦΦ +++++= −−− Dx . . . xxx 2211
 (12) 
 
where tx  is a ( 1×k ) vector of jointly determined I(1) variables, tD  is a ( 1×d ) 
vector of deterministic terms (constants, trends and centred seasonals) and each 
iΦ  ( pi ,,1 K= ) and Ψ are ( kk × ) and ( dk × ) matrices of coefficients to be 
estimated using a (t = 1, . . .T) sample of data. tε  is a ( 1×k ) vector of n.i.d. 
disturbances with zero mean and non-diagonal covariance matrix, Σ .  
Equation (12) represents an unrestricted reduced form of the variables in 
tx  comprising retail and producer prices, a measure of marketing costs and the 
supply and demand shifters. Given the monthly frequency of the data, lag length 
(p) of the VAR is determined for each product group in step-wise fashion 
( 1,,12,13 K=p ) using standard vector-based diagnostics, so that the preferred 
specification is the most parsimonious model that is free of residual correlation at 
the 5% significance level.21 Prior to the cointegration analysis each preferred 
model is checked for parameter constancy using vector-based recursive Chow 
tests.    
The presence of a price transmission relationship between retailer and 
producer is indicated by the detection of cointegration among the variables in tx . 
Rearranging (12) into its error correction form,  
 
 ∑
−
=
−− ++∆+=∆
1
1
'
p
i
ttitiptt εΨDxΓxαβx (13) 
 
we test for cointegration using Johansens’s (1988) maximum likelihood procedure 
in which attention focuses on the ( r×k ) matrix of co-integrating vectors, 
                                                 
21
 Although commonly applied in VAR analyses, information criteria (such as AIC, SBC and 
HQC) tended to select (overly parsimonious) models characterised by residual autocorrelation in 
this study, a feature most likely to reflect the large number of parameters required for a general 
model involving monthly data. Given the object is to adopt the most parsimonious model 
comprising white noise errors, lag length selection was based upon diagnostic tests directly, rather 
than the likelihood-based information criteria.    
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comprising β , that quantify the ‘long-run’ (or equilibrium) relationships between 
the variables in the system and the ( r×k ) matrix of error correction coefficients, 
α , the elements of which load deviations from equilibrium (i.e. pt−xβ' ) into ∆xt, 
for correction. The iΓ  coefficients in (13) estimate the short-run effect of shocks 
on ∆xt, and thereby allow the short and long-run responses to differ.  
Since there may exist up to 1−k  cointegrating relations among the k  
variables in tx , the precise number is evaluated by Johansen’s Trace ( rη ) and 
Maximal Eigenvalue ( rξ ) test statistics (Johansen, 1988). The rη  statistic tests the 
null that there are at least r cointegrating relationships ( kr <≤0 ) and rξ  
evaluates the null that there are r  against the alternative that there are at most 
1+r  such relationships. While the rη  test is generally preferable because it is 
robust to residual non-normality and delivers a sequentially consistent test 
procedure, it is standard practice to report both test statistics (Hariss and Sollis, 
2005, p.123).  
The specification of the deterministic terms in (13) play a pivotal role in 
cointegration inference, not least because the distributions of rη  and rξ  depend 
on these terms and how they enter the model.  In the empirical analysis that 
follows, we estimate (13) with unrestricted constant (but without linear trend) to 
allow for drift in any of the non-stationary variables in tx , a property that 
characterises some of the series we investigate. Linear trend terms are excluded on 
the grounds that while they allow for quadratic and/or trend stationary behaviour 
in tx  (depending on whether the data is I(1) or I(0) respectively) neither 
behaviour is a plausible representation of our data, as we explore in the following 
section.22  
Where a single cointegrating relationship is detected between retail and 
producer prices, formal testing of the significance of the supply and demands 
shocks is undertaken to investigate whether buyer power is present. Following 
from section 2, if the vertical market for a product is perfectly competitive, retail 
and producer prices may be expected to form a cointegrated relationship with at 
most marketing costs. Where retailers exert buying power, the supply and demand 
shifters also enter the pricing relationship. This then gives rise to a null hypothesis 
of perfect competition which can be evaluated empirically by a standard 
likelihood ratio test of the exclusion restrictions on the shifters in the cointegrating 
relation. In addition, given that the theoretical model signs the parameters in the 
pricing relation (11), we can offer some additional evidence on the possible 
                                                 
22
 Where seasonality is present, we augment Dt with centred seasonals, however these do not affect 
the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics. See Juselius (2006) p.139. 
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rejection of perfect competition by comparing the estimated signs of the shifters in 
the cointegrating relation with that predicted by the theoretical model. 
 
6.  RESULTS 
 
As a first step in the descriptive analysis, we analyse the time series properties of 
the data to determine the most appropriate form for the deterministic part of the 
VAR (such as constant, trend and seasonals). Inspection of Figures 1 and 2 
suggests that the series possess the (stochastic) trends that characterize the random 
walk I(1) model. The sustained nature of these trends suggests that a random walk 
with drift may represent a better approximation for many of the series, and for 
lamb (and possibly milk) prices, a seasonal pattern is also apparent. 
Considerations of this sort suggest that the unit root I(1) null should be evaluated 
in a maintained model with constant, trend and where necessary, centred 
seasonals. While the alternative hypothesis of trend stationarity seems an unlikely 
outcome from an economic viewpoint, inclusion of the trend term does ensure 
invariance of the (unit root) test statistic to the presence of drift (see, for example, 
Patterson, pp.233-238).  
Results from the application of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF, 1979) 
are reported in Table 1. The test is applied to the levels (Model 1) and first 
differences (Model 2) of each data series and indicate that the data are I(1) in 
levels and I(0) in first differences, as indeed visual inspection suggests. In cases 
where the data are actually (mean) stationary rather than I(1), the ADF test is 
known to have low statistical power to reject the unit root null (Dickey and Fuller, 
1981) owing to the inclusion of (redundant) trend terms in the ADF regression. In 
recognition of this, we also apply the stationarity test of Kwiatkowski, Phillips, 
Schmidt and Shin (KPSS, 1992) to the price and shifter series shown in Figures 1 
and 2, results of which are also presented in Table 1. With a null hypothesis of 
stationarity, the KPSS test offers an appealing complement to the ADF test.23 
Referring to Table 1, the KPSS test results confirm the non-stationarity of the 
shifters but there is less unanimity regarding prices, where inference largely 
depends on whether a time trend is included in the maintained regression of the 
KPSS test. Specifically, where the null hypothesis is of trend stationarity (Model 
3) the KPSS test rejects in favour of a unit root in ten out of eighteen cases. 
                                                 
23
 Note however that owing to the non- equivalence of these tests, in that the null of the ADF test 
and alternative hypothesis of the KPSS are not identical (see Patterson p.268) a dual testing 
procedure does not offer a panacea. Furthermore, differences in finite sample performance, 
sensitivity of the tests to nuisance parameters and lag length selection also mean that in practice 
contradictory results from the two testing strategies may occur. For further details see Maddala 
and Kim (p.128).  
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 With a (mean) stationary null (Model 4) the unit root alternative is 
favoured in fifteen out of eighteen prices, RL, RP and PPt being the exceptions 
(despite the unit root having been favoured for two of these cases using Model 3). 
While these contradictory results underline the fragility of unit root testing per se 
and the finite sample similarity of the random walk and trend stationarity (even in 
relatively large samples such as those used here), the implausibility of trend 
stationarity from an economic viewpoint suggests we proceed on the basis that the 
random walk (possibly with drift) model is an adequate (albeit imperfect) 
statistical approximation of the data.24 
 To recap, vector error correction models (equation (13)) with unrestricted 
constant are estimated for each of the nine products in a general-to-specific 
strategy for k = 13 to 1, the preferred model in each case being the most 
parsimonious model in which the vector tests of the null of no residual correlation, 
homoscedasticity and parameter constancy cannot be rejected at the 5% level. The 
resulting models represent the baseline against which subsequent parameter 
restrictions are evaluated.25 The presence of a price transmission relationship is 
indicated by the cointegrating rank of each baseline model using the Trace ( rη ) 
and maximal Eigenvalue ( rξ ) tests statistics reported in Table 2. 
                                                 
24
 The negative trend observed in many of the price series seems unlikely to persist indefinitely. 
As Stein’s Law states, “Things that can’t last forever, don’t”. Locally linear trend models (see 
Harvey, 1989) are not considered here. 
25
 Results from parameter constancy tests have been made available to referees but are not 
included in the interest of brevity.  
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Table 1: ADF and KPSS Test Statistics 
ADF KPSS  
Variable (1) 
Levels (c,t) 
(2) 
Differences 
(c) 
(3) 
Levels (c,t) 
(4) 
Levels (c) 
Prices 
RA -2.88 -10.93** 0.10 0.63** 
PA -2.34 -8.51** 0.11 0.99** 
RB -2.21 -11.19** 0.18* 1.49** 
PB -2.46 -7.49** 0.13 1.56** 
RBr -2.85 -11.52** 0.05 1.34** 
PBr -2.92 -8.86** 0.19* 1.23** 
RC -1.35 -10.67** 0.17* 0.51* 
PC -2.65 -3.83** 0.14* 1.40** 
RE -2.58 -16.09** 0.12 0.52* 
PE -2.94 -6.96** 0.17* 1.00** 
RL -3.14 -8.67** 0.23** 0.96** 
PL -3.25 -7.78** 0.15* 0.31 
RM  -1.52 -8.08** 0.28** 1.10** 
PM  -1.57 -9.36** 0.20* 1.11** 
RP    -1.59 -10.20** 0.19* 0.22 
PP -2.23 -8.33** 0.08 1.23** 
RPt -2.33 -11.70** 0.06 0.74** 
PPt -2.17 -10.48** 0.08 0.10 
Shifters 
S -1.91 -8.25** 0.14* 1.50** 
D1 -1.94 -5.27** 0.21* 1.56** 
D2 -2.38 -11.09** 0.20* 1.26** 
M -0.94 -14.12** 0.33** 1.52** 
The ADF test on the variables in levels is conducted using Model (1) which include a constant and linear trend (c,t) 
conditioned on centred seasonals where appropriate. The ADF test is also applied to the variables expressed in first 
differences (Model 2) which includes constant (c) and seasonals where appropriate. Lag length is determined by serial 
correlation test on the residuals evaluated at the 5% level. The 5% and 1% (finite sample) critical values for the ADF test 
are -3.45 and -4.03 for Model (1) and -2.89 and -3.52 for Model (2). Asterisks denote rejection of the unit root null at 5% 
(*) and 1% (**). For the KPSS test, the correction factor for serial correlation is by Barlett Kernel based on Newey-West 
weights. Test statistics evaluate the null of stationarity around linear trend (Model 3) and non-zero mean (Model 4) and 
relate to the variables expressed in levels. The 5% and 1% (asymptotic) critical values are 0.15 and 0.21 for Model (3) and  
0.46 and 0.74 for Model (4).  
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Figure 2: Shifters 
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Table 2: Test Statistics for Cointegration 
Product 
(lag length) 
Rank Trace 
rη  
Maximal Eigenvalue  
rξ  
Product 
(lag length) 
Rank Trace 
rη  
Maximal Eigenvalue  
rξ  
0  66.59 [0.086]*  35.36 [0.029]** 0 102.05 [0.000]***  50.95  [0.000]*** 
1  31.23 [0.657]  14.76 [0.766] 1  51.10  [0.022]**  25.23  [0.097]* 
2  16.47 [0.686]  10.77 [0.677] 2  25.87  [0.136]  17.45  [0.157] 
3  5.70  [0.732]  5.58 [0.672] 3  8.42  [0.429]  8.36  [0.351] 
Apples (4) 
4  0.13  [0.722]  0.13 [0.722] 
Lamb (2) 
Seasonals 
4  0.06  [0.812]  0.06  [0.812] 
0  83.69 [0.002]***  46.00 [0.001]*** 0 131.34 [0.000]***  65.05  [0.000]*** 
1  37.69  [0.320]  18.79  [0.444] 1  66.28  [0.000]***  35.34  [0.003]*** 
2  18.90  [0.511]  12.04  [0.557] 2  30.95  [0.036]**  18.41  [0.118] 
3  6.86  [0.600]  5.82  [0.642] 3  12.53  [0.134]  11.40  [0.137] 
Beef (6) 
4  1.04  [0.307]  1.04  [0.307] 
Milk (4) 
Seasonals 
4  1.14  [0.286]  1.14  [0.286] 
0 109.81 [0.000]***  54.83  [0.000]*** 0  76.26  [0.013]***  28.77  [0.184] 
1  54.98  [0.008]***  33.53  [0.006]*** 1  47.49  [0.153]  21.04  [0.283] 
2  21.45  [0.340]  14.24  [0.359] 2  26.45  [0.119]  16.49  [0.205] 
3  7.21  [0.560]  6.63  [0.542] 3  9.96  [0.289]  9.95  [0.220] 
Bread (9) 
4  0.58  [0.446]  0.58  [0.446] 
Pork (4) 
4  0.01  [0.913]  0.01  [0.913] 
0  96.02  [0.000]***  52.62  [0.000]*** 0  70.60  [0.041]**  32.54  [0.069]* 
1  43.39  [0.123]  22.16  [0.219] 1  38.06  [0.303]  16.99  [0.590] 
2  21.23  [0.354]  15.45  [0.269] 2  21.06  [0.364]  12.53  [0.510] 
3  5.78  [0.723]  5.39 [0.695] 3  8.53  [0.418]  8.26  [0.361] 
Chicken (3) 
4  0.39  [0.531]  0.39  [0.531] 
Potatoes (3) 
4  0.28  [0.600]  0.28  [0.600] 
0  70.32  [0.044]**  27.77  [0.231] 
1  42.55  [0.144]  17.97  [0.509] 
2  24.58  [0.183]  15.49  [0.267] 
3  9.09  [0.363]  8.97  [0.296] 
Eggs (2) 
4  0.13  [0.722]  0.13  [0.722] 
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5% and * at 10%.  p-values are in parentheses. Critical values are those of Doornik (1998). 
Seasonals denotes that the VAR contains monthly centred seasonal dummies. 
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 Overall, the evidence points to the presence of a single cointegrating 
vector in the majority of products. Evaluating hypotheses at the 5% significance 
level, the null of no cointegration is rejected in fourteen out of eighteen tests. At 
least one test rejects the null of no cointegration for every product. Using the more 
reliable Trace statistic, cointegration is detected in all products at the 5% level, 
except apples where the p-value is 9%. Test statistics suggest the presence of 
multiple cointegration relations for bread, lamb and milk although the presence of 
centred seasonals in the models for the last two products is a potential explanation 
for the apparent distortion to the size of the tests in these cases.26 In the absence of 
any obvious economic explanation for relationships other than the price 
transmission relation, we proceed on the assumption that a single cointegrating 
vector is present for each product.  Finally, as an informal check on the adequacy 
of the long-run specification, we inspect the cointegrating residuals from each 
baseline model for the tell-tales of model mis-specification such as trending or 
structural change. Each set of residuals appear to be ‘well-behaved’ with zero 
mean and no trend (see appendix) lending casual support to the adequacy of the 
chosen specifications.  
 Table 3 reports the parameters of the cointegrating vectors normalized on 
retail prices obtained from each baseline model. Recall that the theoretical model 
presented in section 2 signs these coefficients such that, 01 >β  and 02 >β ; and 
where buyer power exists, 03 >β  and 04 <β  (for demand increasing and supply 
decreasing shocks respectively). Referring to the table a number of points seem 
noteworthy: first, price transmission coefficients ( 1β ) are positive in all cases; 
second, marketing costs, as proxied by the index of real average earnings in 
services, ( 2β ) are positive in seven out of nine cases; third, the coefficient on the 
demand shifter ( 3β ) is correctly signed in seven out of nine cases; and fourth, the 
coefficient on the supply shifter is correctly signed in six out of nine cases. 
Overall, the results accord well with theoretical predictions. Of key interest are the 
results relating to the demand and supply shifters, since it is through these 
variables that the existence of buyer power is mediated in the theoretical model. 
Since the standard errors from the cointegrating relations in Table 3 are based 
upon approximation, we perform a set of likelihood ratio tests to evaluate the 
statistical significance of these coefficients, results of which are contained in 
Table 4. 
                                                 
26
 Although the asymptotic distributions of these test statistics are invariant to centred seasonals, 
the small sample performance is currently unknown (see Juselius, 2006, p.136). Estimation 
without the seasonal dummies supports the existence of a single cointegrating relationship in both 
lamb and milk, suggesting that size distortion is responsible for the apparent multiple cointegration 
findings indicated in the table. Alternative test statistics such as those proposed by Saikkonen and 
Lütkepohl (2000) may be beneficial however they are not available in the software used.  
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Table 3: The Cointegrating Vectors (normalised on retail prices) 
Product Producer 
prices 
( 1β ) 
Marketing 
costs 
( 2β ) 
Demand 
shifter 
( 3β ) 
Supply 
shifter 
( 4β ) 
Apples 1.67*** 
 (0.22) 
5.74***  
(2.18) 
1.41 
 (2.33) 
-0.13 
(0.99) 
Beef 1.62***  
(0.13) 
4.46*** 
(0.93) 
27.45*** 
(3.16) 
-1.57*** 
(0.48) 
Bread 3.64*** 
(0.69) 
4.62*** 
(1.04) 
3.59*** 
(0.97) 
-0.82** 
(0.32) 
Chicken 6.13*** 
(1.01) 
-5.13*** 
(1.80) 
20.36*** 
(4.85) 
-5.13*** 
(1.30) 
Eggs 1.29*** 
(0.36) 
0.33 
(0.53) 
11.95*** 
(1.65) 
0.59 
(0.42) 
Lamb 1.25*** 
(0.10) 
2.17  
(1.61) 
0.14 
(4.64) 
-4.91*** 
 (1.08) 
Milk 1.08***  
(0.15) 
0.20***  
(0.04) 
-0.31** 
(0.15) 
-0.02  
(0.04) 
Pork 0.87** 
(0.43) 
-8.57*** 
(3.29) 
54.09*** 
(7.77) 
5.82*** 
(1.77) 
Potatoes 2.54** * 
(0.44) 
5.91***  
(0.96) 
3.29***  
(0.95) 
0.21  
(0.41) 
Figures in bracket are asymptotic standard errors; *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5% and * 
at 10%. Note however that estimators of the variance of the cointegrating parameters are, strictly 
speaking, not defined (see Banerjee et al. 1993 p.61-64). While it is common practice to use 
approximations to calculate standard errors, we use formal likelihood ratio tests to facilitate 
inference regarding buyer power (see Table 3).  
 
 Each cell contains a likelihood ratio statistic and its associated asymptotic 
p-value. The first column of results evaluates the null hypothesis that both shifters 
are jointly insignificant, and is thus our test of buyer power. Test statistics are 
distributed as )2(2χ  under the null hypothesis of no buyer power (i.e. perfect 
competition). Results indicate that the null of perfect competition can be rejected 
in seven of the nine products, milk and apples being the exceptions. Tests of the 
individual significance of each shifter are distributed as )1(2χ with rejection of the 
perfectly competitive null occurring in 10 of the 18 tests at the 5% level. Again, 
milk and apples are found not to reject the perfectly competitive nulls. 
Importantly, nine out of ten of the statistically significant coefficients are signed 
in accordance with buyer power in the theoretical model.  
 
25Lloyd et al.: Buyer Power in U.K. Food Retailing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
   
 
 
Table 4: Tests for Competition 
Product 0: 430 ==ββH  0: 30 =βH  0: 40 =βH  
Apples 0.42  [0.8111] 
0.24  
[0.6275]  
0.01  
[0.9104] 
Beef 23.95 *** [0.0000] 
18.30*** 
[0.0000] 
8.38***  
[0.0038] 
Bread 7.19**  [0.0275] 
7.10*** 
[0.0077] 
4.33**  
[0.0374] 
Chicken 29.48*** [0.0000] 
6.54** 
[0.0105] 
29.37*** 
[0.0000] 
Eggs 12.14 *** [0.0023] 
9.77*** 
[0.0018] 
0.70  
[0.4044] 
Lamb 19.76*** [0.0001] 
0.00  
[0.9844] 
13.37***  
[0.0003] 
Milk 2.82  [0.2443] 
2.43  
[0.1194] 
0.14  
[0.7102] 
Pork 10.14 *** [0.0063] 
7.17*** 
[0.0074] 
1.91  
[0.1669] 
Potatoes  15.2*** [0.0005] 
6.66*** 
[0.0099] 
0.17  
[0.6764] 
Figures in brackets are asymptotic p-values; *** shows significance at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10% 
 
Reflecting upon the pattern of results across products, it appears that 
rejection of the perfectly competitive null is spread across meat and non-meat 
products. Whilst any justification for the observed pattern is understandably 
conjectural, it is interesting that we find no evidence for the exercise of buyer 
power in milk, a product around which much attention, and indeed controversy 
has centred in recent years.27 Most major UK retailers28 have accepted fines 
amounting to £116 million imposed by the Office of Fair Trading in 2007 for 
price collusion with milk and dairy product processors during the early 2000s 
(Office of Fair Trading, 2007b). Thus if the milk price spread was being 
maintained by collusion rather than competition, as the regulatory authorities have 
found to be the case, it is little wonder that our simple test is unable to detect what 
amounts to relatively sophisticated strategic pricing behaviour.  
 
 
                                                 
27
 See, for example, House of Commons (2004).  
28
 At the time of writing, Morrisons is exempt for the ruling and Tesco is disputing the judgment. 
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Figure 3: The Milk Retail-Producer Price Spread (pence per pint) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
11
12
13
14
15
 
In this regard, note also from Figure 3 that there was no overall trend in 
the retail-farm spread; the “success” of the test reported for other commodities is 
consistent with a widening spread and the exogenous shifters indicating the 
potential existence of buyer power. Given the raw data, it is therefore not 
surprising that we cannot reject the null hypothesis in this specific case. There 
could of course be some other aspect of buyer/seller power that exists in this 
market and that the concerns about collusion between retailers and processors did 
not negatively impact on milk producers taken over the period for which our data 
applies. While similar observations or explanations cannot account for the apple 
results (where the spread between retail and farm level prices was rising over the 
period), we merely note here that although statistically insignificant, both shifters 
are signed in accordance with theoretical prediction in this case. 
 Returning to the results presented in Table 2, there are two further 
caveats to note. First, while the theoretical model additionally implies that 11 <β , 
this condition is seldom met in the empirical setting. This may be due to 
heterogeneity within product groups and other practical factors such as wastage 
and differences in product specification that interfere with the strict one-to-one 
correspondence of products as they move through the marketing ‘chain’ in the 
theoretical model. Second, the estimated coefficients on the marketing costs proxy 
is negative in the models for chicken and pork, and as such are at odds with their 
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role in the theoretical model. This is likely to reflect the inadequacy of a general 
marketing cost variable such as labour costs and/or that we are unable to pick-up 
specific trends in marketing technology or costs with it in these cases.  
Nevertheless, the overall correspondence between theoretical prediction and 
empirical finding is a noteworthy feature of the analysis. To the extent that this 
merely confirms the potential existence of buyer power identified by the 
competition authorities, our findings are not new but arguably lend ‘scientific’ 
substance to the survey and witness-based evidence compiled by the competition 
authorities. Moreover, since the purpose of our analysis is to evaluate whether the 
exercise of buyer power may be detected econometrically using aggregate level 
data, the corroboration offered in this paper is potentially useful to those 
conducting analyses of this type in other countries where retailer dominance is 
also of public concern. However, it is important to re-iterate the caveat reported in 
the Introduction; while these results lend a filter to explore whether buyer power 
is important, the rejection of the null hypothesis of perfect competition under the 
assumptions employed suggest that buyer power is at least a candidate for 
explaining the spread between retail and farm prices. As such, rejection of the null 
hypothesis is supportive of further investigation but not the end of the road in 
terms of concluding that buyer power unambiguously characterises the links 
between retailers and producers. 
 
7.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
In this paper, we have devised a simple means of testing for the presence of buyer 
power in vertically-related markets such as those characterising the food chain. By 
constructing a quasi-reduced form model of the retailer-supplier pricing equations, 
the null of perfect competition can be rejected if the shifters from the supply and 
demand equations are significant and correctly signed. In principle, the approach 
sits between other methods of evaluation, to which it is complementary. In 
particular, we are able to move away from naïve concentration-based indicators of 
buyer power and the practical limitations of structural econometric modelling. The 
approach is simple and transparent yet delivers a statistical test derived from a 
theoretically-consistent basis. Furthermore, the test demands relatively little in 
terms of data and is implemented using standard techniques of modern time-series 
analysis. The technique is most applicable where products undergo relatively little 
transformation between marketing levels and is thus particularly well-suited to the 
relatively unprocessed products of the food chain. In the UK at least, these are 
also products over which concerns of potential buyer power abuse have been most 
acute.  
Drawing on data from a basket of nine basic products of the UK food 
industry, we show that in seven cases, the hypothesis of perfect competition can 
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be firmly rejected at conventional levels of significance, implying that for these 
food products at least, the market is characterised by buyer power by our measure. 
As such, our findings corroborate the findings of Competition Commission (2000) 
and lend support to the recent request by the Office of Trading for further detailed 
scrutiny of the UK food chain by the UK’s competition authorities. Of course, we 
cannot interpret our results as being conclusive of the use of buyer power in UK 
food retailing. Among many important caveats are that the test is predicated on 
simplifying assumptions, the data subject to measurement problems and the 
procedures prone to statistical error. However, the methods we employ are both 
familiar to applied economists and readily implemented, and deliver what we may 
call a ‘first pass’ test, that when used in combination with other evidential 
indicators, can be useful in contributing to uncovering the existence of buyer 
power in the vertical food chain. 
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Appendix Table 1: Data Definitions and Sources29  
 
Lab
el 
Variable Units Area Comments Source  
RA  Retail apple  Index of pence/lb (1987=100) UK Desert apples only Employment Gazette/Labour Market Trends 
PA  Producer apple  Index of pence/lb (1987=100) UK Exclude direct subsidies  Department of Food, Environment and Rural 
Affairs 
RB Retail beef price Pence/kg carcass weight equivalent GB Converted to c.w.e by MLC Meat and Livestock Commission 
PB  Producer beef price Pence/kg carcass weight  GB Sample of auction & abattoir average Meat and Livestock Commission 
RBr  Retail bread price ln(pence/800g loaf) UK Standard 800g white sliced loaf Employment Gazette/Labour Market Trends 
PBr  Producer bread price ln(£/ton) UK Bread wheat  Department of Food, Environment and Rural 
Affairs 
RC Retail chicken price Pence/kg carcass weight  GB Uncooked whole birds including frozen <1.81 
kg 
National Food Survey/Expenditure and Food 
Survey 
PC  Producer chicken price Pence/kg  carcass weight E&W Birds <2.27 kg National Farmers Union 
RE Retail egg price Pence/dozen  Eggs of size 2   
PE Producer egg price Pence/dozen  Eggs of size 3  
RL Retail lamb price Pence/Kg carcass weight equivalent  GB Converted in to c.w.e. by MLC Meat and Livestock Commission 
PL Producer lamb price Pence/kg carcass weight  GB Sample of auction & abattoir average Meat and Livestock Commission 
RM Retail milk price Pence/pint UK Semi skimmed only Employment Gazette/Labour Market Trends 
PM Producer milk price Pence/pint UK Average all milk Department of Food, Environment and Rural 
Affairs 
RPt  Retail potato price Pence/lb UK Old white, sold loose Employment Gazette/Labour Market Trends 
PPt  Producer potato price Pence/lb UK Average all potatoes (including processor sales) Department of Food, Environment and Rural 
Affairs 
S Farm supply shock  Index of farm input prices 
(1997=100) 
UK Includes all Goods and services currently 
consumed on UK farms 
Department of Food, Environment and Rural 
Affairs 
D1 Meat demand shock  Ln (cumulative count of newspaper 
‘food scare’ articles) 
UK Articles appearing in Times, Sunday Times, 
Guardian and Observer. 
Euro-PA Associates, Northhampton. 
D2 Non-meat demand shock Food Retail Price Index 
(1987=100) 
UK Includes all food items in RPI Office of National Statistics 
M  Marketing shock  Index (2000=100) of average 
earnings in GB service sector, 
including bonuses.  
GB Series known as RLNMT by ONS. Seasonally 
adjusted 
Office of National Statistics 
                                                 
29Data available from 1990.1 to 2001.10 (130 observations) except eggs (1992.1 – 2001.10; 118 observations) and milk (1995.1 – 2001.10; 82 
observations). All monetary variables expressed in real terms using the (all products) RPI. 
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Appendix Figure 1:  Residuals of Cointegrating Vectors 
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Bread 
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Eggs 
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Milk 
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